Information Theoretic Security: 5th International by Yuval Ishai (auth.), Serge Fehr (eds.)

By Yuval Ishai (auth.), Serge Fehr (eds.)

This booklet constitutes the refereed lawsuits of the fifth foreign convention on details Theoretic safeguard, held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, in may perhaps 2011.
The 12 revised complete papers provided including 7 invited lectures have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from 27 submissions. knowing the minimum standards for information-theoretic safeguard is a relevant a part of this line of study. Very appealing is the mathematical neatness of the sphere, and its wealthy connections to different parts of arithmetic, like likelihood and data thought, algebra, combinatorics, coding conception, and quantum info processing, simply to point out the main trendy ones.

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Extra info for Information Theoretic Security: 5th International Conference, ICITS 2011, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, May 21-24, 2011. Proceedings

Example text

P r[mR = mS ] ≥ P r[m = mS ∨ IR = B2 ] ∗ P r[K = K ∨ IS = B2 ] ∗ P r[Ev] 1 1 1 ≥ 1− ∗ 1− ∗ 1− |F| |F| |F| 3 ≥ 1− |F| 3 Hence, the protocol is |F| -reliable. This argument can be further extended to show that through this protocol even if S sends a set of messages MS (|MS | > 1), in parallel, the probability that R receives all of them reliably is still at 3 . This can be shown by replacing single messages in the probability least 1 − |F| expressions by message sets and they shall be considered equal only when all the messages in them are equal.

We refer to Sect. 6 for a further discussion of how to handle invalid messages. Relations between Non-malleability, Secrecy, and Authenticity 6 21 Concluding Remarks In this work we studied information-theoretic non-malleability, extending a line of research initiated by Hanaoka et al. [7]. The formal definitions used to capture the intuitive notion of non-malleability follow these previous works [7,5,10]. There exist however alternative ways to characterize the same notion. We discuss them briefly in this section.

Let S receive K . Since S ∈ Z1 (R), S has a path to R that avoids B2 . Let that path be p2 . • If S successfully verifies K , it sends ζ(mS , K ) to R along the path p2 . In addition to this it also sends m ∈R F to R along p2 . • If the verification fails then S knows the identity of the corrupt set with very high probability. Let IS denote the identity knowledge of S. First S chooses (f1 , f2 ) ∈R F2 on its own and sends (f1 , f2 ) to R through p2 (thus, tries to inform R that it didn’t receive the keys from b).

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